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Abstract
Background: Whenever South African (SA) research institutions share human biological material and associated
data for health research or clinical trials they are legally compelled to have a material transfer agreement (MTA) in
place that uses as framework the standard MTA newly gazetted by the South African Minister of Health (SA MTA).
Main body: The article offers a legal analysis of the SA MTA and focuses on its substantive fit with the broader
legal environment in South Africa, and the clarity and practicality of its terms. The following problematic aspects of
the SA MTA are highlighted: (a) Where only data and no human biological material are transferred, the SA MTA
does not apply, leaving a lacuna; (b) Health Research Ethics Committees are required to be parties to a MTA despite
it being outside their legal mandate and undermining their oversight function; (c) the SA MTA’s consent provisions
are not aligned with extant law; and, similarly, (d) its provision on donor ownership is misaligned with extant law;
(e) its creation of fictitious performance can only cause frustration on the part of an injured party; (f) its benefit-
sharing provision is vague and will have little practical effect; (g) its dispute-resolution provisions fail to adequately
protect South African research institutions and research participants; (h) it fails to provide substantive guidance
regarding intellectual property as its provisions relating to intellectual property may cause practical problems; and,
finally, (i) its data privacy provision is insufficiently specific, is overbroad, and fails to provide terms that in general
would facilitate the international sharing of human biological material and associated data in terms of existing
privacy law.
Conclusions: While some of the problematic aspects of the SA MTA are intricate and require consultative processes
with stakeholders and others, to develop comprehensive solutions, most of the problematic aspects can be
resolved immediately through amendments by the South African Minister of Health. The formulation of such
amendments is proposed and, where possible, interim measures are suggested that may ameliorate the problems
presented by the SA MTA.
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Background
Because biomedical researchers rely heavily on biological
and bio-informatic resources that are collected and cre-
ated by others, there is growing need to share these re-
sources [1]. A resource shared frequently and almost
routinely is that of human biological material and its as-
sociated data. However, this commonplace sharing of
human biological material and associated data raises a
myriad of legal and ethical issues in terms of this shared
relationship. For example, because research potentially
can lead to valuable discoveries, the ownership and con-
trol of downstream discoveries can become contentious.
In these circumstances, how are the legal rights and du-
ties between the sharing researchers to be determined?
Material transfer agreements
A material transfer agreement (MTA) is a written agree-
ment between two research institutions, one being the
provider (Provider) of human biological material and the
other the recipient (Recipient) that intends to use this
material for research purposes. A MTA governs the
transfer of tangible research materials such as reagents,
cell lines, plasmids, vectors and any progeny, derivatives
or modifications between the parties. The transfer of as-
sociated data may be regulated in a MTA or in a separ-
ate data transfer agreement (DTA). MTAs range from
short, simple agreements to complex agreements that in-
volve lengthy and costly negotiations [2].
Primarily to save on the transactional cost involved in
negotiating custom MTAs, there have been various at-
tempts to develop standardised MTAs for international
use. Perhaps the most well-known example is the Uni-
form Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UB MTA)
that was developed by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) in collaboration with research institutions. The
UB MTA has been in use for over a generation and has
been adopted by 684 institutions from all over the world
[3]. An institution that adopts the UB MTA signs a mas-
ter agreement which is filed at a central repository. Insti-
tutions that are UB MTA signatories in transferring
material between one another need merely to execute a
standard Implementing Letter for each transfer [4]. The
UB MTA was designed for the transfer of proprietary
biological materials [5], but it is worth noting that the
NIH also developed a stand-alone MTA template specif-
ically for use in transferring human biological material
[6]. Further, a number of other prominent organisations
have standardised MTAs. An example is the World
Health Organisation (WHO) that uses Standard Material
Transfer Agreement 2 (SMTA 2) for the sharing of hu-
man biological materials with institutions as part of their
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework [7].
There is a growing international concern that research
specimens and data are not shared optimally globally [8].
The need to provide greater access to research data sets
has been articulated in a number of documents, includ-
ing the OECD Principles and Guidelines for Access to
Research Data from Public Funding [9], the Toronto
Statement [10], and the Global Alliance for Genomics
and Health’s White Paper [11]. A major obstacle to
more effective sharing across national borders is contra-
dictory legal and ethical frameworks [8]. What is re-
quired legally and is viewed as ethical in one country
may be regarded completely differently in another coun-
try. To facilitate the movement to provide greater global
access in sharing bio-resources, a group of bioethicists
have initiated a project to develop an international Char-
ter of Principles for Sharing Data and Bio-Specimens [8]
which aims to overcome the obstacle of contradictory
domestic legal and ethical frameworks, and which in-
cludes a template MTA and DTA [8].
Legal development in South Africa
The high genetic diversity of Southern African popula-
tions is well-known. Consequently, the large-scale col-
lection of human biological material from South Africa
(and the data subsequently derived) hold a promise of
making a huge impact on the prevention, diagnosis and
treatment of disease – not only in South Africa but
worldwide. Unsurprisingly, the South African research
community is part of numerous international collabora-
tive research projects that involve the sharing of human
biological material and associated data, such as H3Af-
rica, B3Africa, HapMap, and MalariaGEN [12].
Against this background, in July 2018 the South Afri-
can Minister of Health (the Minister) published a stand-
ard MTA (SA MTA) in the Government Gazette and
gave notice that South African research institutions
sharing human biological material for health research or
clinical trials must have a MTA in place based on the
SA MTA [13]. This development makes South Africa
unique in the world as the only country to require the
use of a standard MTA through national legislation and
forces even parties outside South Africa to use the SA
MTA when engaging in the transfer of human biological
material to or from South Africa.
In this article we offer a legal analysis of the SA MTA
and concentrate on its substantive fit with the broader
legal environment in South Africa, as well as on the clar-
ity and legal practicality of its terms. Although we recog-
nise that the topic of the SA MTA intersects with
various ethical discourses such as whether research par-
ticipants have a moral entitlement to benefit-sharing and
the movement (referred to above) to increase global ac-
cess to bio-resources, our analysis is limited to the core
legal issues mentioned above.
In the following paragraphs we familiarise the reader
with the legal environment related to the use of human
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biological material for research in South Africa and with
the ratio legis of the SA MTA. After providing this back-
ground information, we proceed to the analysis of the
SA MTA in the main body of the article.
Legal environment in South Africa
The SA MTA was introduced into an extensive and
well-developed domestic legal environment relating to
the use of human biological material for research that is
primarily governed by the National Health Act (NHA)
[14] and its various regulations. In this section we pro-
vide the reader with a brief overview of the most salient
aspects of the legal environment that are relevant to our
analysis of the SA MTA below.
First, informed consent must be obtained in writing
from research participants for their participation in the
research project ([14] section 71) and for the removal of
human biological material ([15] regulation 3(1)(a)). In
addition, a researcher who conducts health-related re-
search involving human participants (which includes re-
search on human biological material and associated data
given that these are provided by human research partici-
pants) is legally compelled, inter alia, to consult with
representatives from the participating community or
other relevant research stakeholders where appropriate
and to disseminate the research results, negative or posi-
tive, to research stakeholders in a timely and competent
manner ([16] regulation 5).
There is no legal provision per se for benefit sharing
in the context of the provision of human biological ma-
terial. In fact, compensation for providing human bio-
logical material for research is limited to reasonable
costs incurred and ‘to receive any form of financial or
other reward’ is unlawful and a criminal offence ([14]
section 60(4),(5)). Also, it is important to note that per-
sons who provide their human biological material for
use in a research project legally are deemed to transfer
exclusive rights in the human biological material to the
research organisation that receives the material for use
in research ([17] regulation 26). With regard to owner-
ship of the results of research if the research received
public funding, the recipient of such funding – typically
a university – has a legal right to register and own the
intellectual property emanating from the research ([18]
section 4(1)). The recipient of public funding also has
various legal duties to protect such intellectual property
– even if it elects not to retain ownership in its intellec-
tual property or not to obtain statutory protection for
the intellectual property ([18] sections 4(2) and 5(1)).
The possibility exists to co-own the intellectual property
with a private entity if a number of criteria are fulfilled,
including a contribution of resources and the co-
creation of the relevant intellectual property by the pri-
vate entity ([18] section 15(2)). Although research
participants contribute resources (in the form of their
human biological material), they do not conduct the ac-
tual research and therefore are excluded from being co-
owners of intellectual property emanating from publicly-
funded research using their human biological material.
Proposed health-related research studies in South Af-
rica must be approved by a health research ethics com-
mittee (HREC) that is registered with the National
Health Research Ethics Council ([14] section 73) – a
statutory body appointed by the Minister of Health ([14]
section 72(2)). An institution that conducts health re-
search must either to have its own HREC or to have ac-
cess to a HREC ([14] section 73(1)). Currently, there are
46 HRECs registered with the Council [19], of which
about two-thirds are university-based research ethics
committees; about a third are research ethics commit-
tees belonging to various other bodies involved in health
research and one HREC is a private company [19].
The mandate of HRECs in terms of the NHA is to en-
sure that a proposed health-research study has a health-
related purpose and that they meet the particular
HREC’s ethical standards ([14] section 73(2)). However,
the NHA further provides that the National Health Re-
search Ethics Council must set national norms and stan-
dards ([14] section 72(6)(c)). The most pertinent source
establishing such standards that was produced by this
Council and subsequently was issued by the Department
of Health is a document titled Ethics in Health Research:
Principles, Processes and Structures (Department of
Health Ethics Guidelines) [20]. These Guidelines provide
that the primary role of HRECs is to protect the interests
of research participants ([20] p40).
It is important to note that the Department of Health
Ethics Guidelines are not only binding on HRECs, but
effectively have the force of law and apply to all research
on human biological material and associated data. This
is because the Regulations relating to Research with Hu-
man Participants provide that all research with human
participants (which includes research on human bio-
logical material and associated data, given that these are
provided by human research participants) must comply
with ethics guidelines issued by the Department of
Health ([16] regulations 2(a), 6(b)).
An important issue dealt with in the Department of
Health Ethics Guidelines is the nature of informed con-
sent. The Guidelines provide that the following forms of
consent are acceptable ([20] p31):
– ‘Narrow (restrictive) consent’, which is described as
‘the donor permits use of the biological specimen for
single use only; no storage of leftover specimen; and
no sharing of data or specimen. This form
necessitates new consent if further use is desirable’.
Consent to a ‘single use’ – a specific research
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purpose – is more commonly referred to as ‘specific
consent’.
– Tiered consent, which is described as ‘the donor
provides consent for the primary study and chooses
whether to permit storage for future use, sample
and data sharing’.
– Broad consent, which is described as ‘the donor
permits use of the specimen for current research, for
storage and possible future research purposes, even
though the precise nature of future research may be
unclear at present’.
Unrestricted or ‘blanket’ consent is ‘not recommended’
([20] p31). There is also a clear preference for broad con-
sent: The Guidelines state that consent should be ‘broad
enough to allow for future and secondary uses of data,
in line with the opportunities to use such data in advan-
cing knowledge to improve health’ ([20] p31).
These provisions on consent contained in the Depart-
ment of Health Ethics Guidelines may be disrupted by
the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA)
[21]. Although POPIA was enacted in 2013, provisions
relevant to research participant consent only have en-
tered into force on 1 July 2020 [22]. Furthermore, given
that POPIA contains a one-year grace period ([21] sec-
tion 114(1)), its actual enforcement date will only be
from 1 July 2021. In the following paragraphs, we pro-
vide a brief overview of the relevant provisions of
POPIA.
POPIA will govern the processing of personal informa-
tion. ‘Processing’ is defined as including, inter alia, the
collection, storage, use, dissemination, distribution, and
destruction of information ([21] section 1); ‘personal in-
formation’ is defined as including, inter alia, physical or
mental health information, and biometric information,
which, in turn, includes DNA analysis ([21] section 1).
Accordingly, the data associated with human biological
material in the context of health research would in all
likelihood fall within the ambit of POPIA. Also, to the
extent that human biological material will be used for
genetics and genomics research, human biological ma-
terial itself can be perceived as a container of biometric
information, and would therefore also fall within the
ambit of POPIA [23].
POPIA provides that personal information must be
processed according to eight conditions for processing
([21] section 4(1)). Most pertinent for present purposes
are the following conditions:
– The ‘processing limitation’ condition provides that
personal information may only be processed if a
legal ground for processing is present ([21] sections
9–12). One of these legal grounds – and probably
the only one applicable in the context of health
research – is consent by the ‘data subject’ (the
research participant in the health research context).
Consent is defined as ‘any voluntary, specific and
informed expression of will in terms of which
permission is given for the processing of personal
information’ ([21] section 1, emphasis added).
– The ‘purpose specification’ condition provides that
personal data ‘must be collected for a specific,
explicitly defined and lawful purpose’ ([21] section
13, emphasis added).
– The ‘further processing limitation’ condition
provides that there can be ‘further processing’ of
personal information under certain circumstances,
including, inter alia, when such ‘further processing’
is for purposes of research, subject to the condition
that the further processing is carried out solely for
the research purpose and the personal information
may not be published in any identifiable form ([21]
section 15).
Worth noting is that a person’s health and biometric
information also qualifies as ‘special personal informa-
tion’ in terms of POPIA ([21] section 26(a)). To process
special personal information, a legal ground for process-
ing must be present from an additional set of possible
legal grounds ([21] section 27(1)). There is some overlap
between the legal grounds for processing personal infor-
mation, and for processing special personal information,
such as consent by the ‘data subject’. Again, the meaning
of consent is determined by its definition, namely ‘any
voluntary, specific and informed expression of will in
terms of which permission is given for the processing of
personal information’ ([21] section 1, emphasis added).
Another legal ground for processing special personal in-
formation that is pertinent in the present context is re-
search, provided that (a) such research serves a public
interest, or that (b) it is impossible or would involve a
disproportionate effort to ask for consent to such re-
search, and sufficient guarantees are provided for to en-
sure that the processing does not adversely affect the
research participant’s privacy to a disproportionate ex-
tent ([21] section 27(1)(d)).
Despite the clear and unambiguous definition of con-
sent as a specific expression of will, some have argued
that POPIA may be interpreted as allowing broad con-
sent, based on the legal doctrine of purposive interpret-
ation [24]. We have reservations about the legal merits
of such an argument. The South Africa’s Constitutional
Court has held that a ‘purposive reading of a statute
must of course remain faithful to the actual wording of
the statute’ [25]. Accordingly, an attempt to change the
meaning of the word ‘specific’ as used in POPIA to
‘broad’ seems to be based on an over-enthusiastic reli-
ance on purposive interpretation [26]. This debate about
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interpretation aside, POPIA itself makes provision that
the Information Regulator (POPIA’s enforcement mech-
anism) can exempt persons from having to comply with
the eight conditions for processing personal information
([21] section 37(1)(a)); also, POPIA provides that the In-
formation Regulator may authorise a person to process
special personal information, subject to any conditions
that may be specified ([21] section 27(2)). We suggest
that a case potentially can be made (in terms of sections
37(2)(e), (f) and 27(2)) for such an exemption and au-
thorisation for persons engaging in health research. Ac-
cordingly, the actual impact of POPIA on the kind of
consent required in South Africa from health research
participants will only become clear once the Information
Regulator has considered and decided whether to grant
an exemption and an authorisation, as well as the scope
and conditions of these, if granted. Given the present
uncertainty we will refrain from analysing the SA MTA
from the perspective of the consent provisions of
POPIA.
Another important aspect of POPIA that will not be
subject to a potential exemption or authorisation is its
export provisions ([21] sections 72, 57). First, a Provider
may only transfer personal information to a Recipient in
a foreign country if a legal ground for such transfer is
present ([21] section 72). These legal grounds include,
inter alia, consent by the ‘data subject’, and that the law
in the jurisdiction of the Recipient or the contract be-
tween the Provider and the Recipient must provide an
‘adequate’ level of protection for the processing of per-
sonal information ([21] section 72). Secondly, when a
Provider in South Africa intends to transfer special per-
sonal information to a Recipient in a foreign country
that does not provide an ‘adequate’ level of protection,
the Provider must obtain prior authorisation for the
intended transfer from the Information Regulator ([21]
section 57(1)(d)). A failure to obtain prior authorisation
will constitute a criminal offence ([21] section 59). How-
ever, if the Information Regulator has approved a code
of conduct for the relevant sector, the need for prior au-
thorisation is obviated ([21] section 57(3)).
The import and export of human biological material
more generally are regulated by a dedicated set of
regulations [27]. These regulations provide, inter alia,
that a permit from the Director-General of the De-
partment of Health is required for the import and ex-
port of human biological material ([27] regulation
2(1)). As well, these regulations lay down numerous
general requirements for the import and export of
human biological material, including, pertinently, that
written proof must be provided that the human bio-
logical material that is to be exported was donated in
terms of the NHA and will be used in terms of the
NHA ([27] regulation 3(1)).
The Department of Health Ethics Guidelines provide
that whenever human biological material is shared be-
tween institutions, a written agreement must be in place,
but give no guidance regarding the content of such a
written agreement ([20] p37). This point is a lead into
the next section, namely the rationale for the SA MTA.
Rationale for the SA MTA
The SA MTA does not have a preamble but tersely
states under the heading ‘Objective’ that its objective is
‘to set out a framework within which the Parties will en-
gage in the transfer, use and other processing of the Ma-
terials’. Therefore, it appears the SA MTA aims to
provide minimum content and principles for MTAs that
fall within its scope of application. Other than this state-
ment the SA MTA provides no indication as to its sub-
stantive objectives.
As discussed above, the typical rationale for having a
standard MTA is to save transactional costs and time.
However, this rationale may be less prominent – if rele-
vant at all – in the context of the SA MTA. The Minis-
ter might have had other reasons for promulgating the
SA MTA as has been suggested in the academic litera-
ture. These reasons include the following: (a) There is a
history of accusations of unethical or illegal conduct by
health researchers regarding the use of South African –
and more generally African – human biological material
[28]; (b) there is a movement against so-called ‘research
imperialism’ that refers to situations where researchers
in the Global North undertake research in the Global
South but do not share the benefits of that research in a
fair way with research participants and scientific collabo-
rators in the Global South [28]; (c) many cultures in
South Africa attach particular significance to human bio-
logical material [29]; and (d) MTAs used in the inter-
national sphere are perceived not to address legal
concerns specific to South Africa [29]. Clearly, these rea-
sons point to a desire for a more protectionist national
legislation, in seeming contrast with the movement (re-
ferred to above) to promote greater access to bio-
resources elsewhere. These reasons would explain the
decision that South Africa needed a national standard
MTA and that the use of a national standard MTA
should be a legal requirement. However, whether the SA
MTA actually is successful in addressing the problems
underlying these reasons is open to debate.
Main text
In this section we offer a legal analysis of the SA MTA,
concentrating on its substantive fit with the broader
legal environment in South Africa and on the clarity and
legal practicality of its terms. We highlight our concerns,
propose corrective legislative measures and, where pos-
sible, propose measures that researchers may take in the
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interim to mitigate these concerns. Our analysis starts with
the general issue of application, and then considers other is-
sues in the order in which they arise in the SA MTA.
Application
The notice by the Minister in the Government Gazette
to which the SA MTA is a schedule reads as follows:
All the providers and recipients of the biological ma-
terial for use in research or clinical trials under the aus-
pices of the Health Research Ethics Committees shall
use the Material Transfer Agreement of Human Bio-
logical Materials.
Accordingly, the SA MTA must be used whenever any
human biological material is transferred for the purpose
of research or clinical trials from the Provider to the Re-
cipient, and – to bring the transfer under the jurisdiction
of South Africa – at least one of the institutions is in
South Africa. In a recent article on the SA MTA,
Labuschaigne et al. suggest that the SA MTA is applic-
able only in the case of export, in other words when the
Provider is in South Africa and the Recipient is located
in a foreign jurisdiction [30]. However, the Minister’s
notice does not limit the application of the SA MTA to
the export of human biological material with the result
all that is required to compel the use of the SA MTA is
that either the Provider or the Recipient, or both, is in
South Africa.
The provisions of the SA MTA are not limited to the
transfer of human biological material but contain rules
governing the transfer of associated data. In the SA
MTA, ([13] paragraph 2.13), human biological material
and associated data collectively are referred to as ‘Mate-
rials’ – the first letter is in uppercase to indicate that the
word is used as defined and not in its ordinary meaning.
However, the Minister’s notice in the Government Gaz-
ette speaks of ‘biological material’ in lowercase, indicat-
ing that these words are intended to carry their ordinary
meaning. Also, it is worth noting there is no indication
either in the notice or in its schedule (the SA MTA) that
the definitions in the schedule are applicable to the no-
tice, which means that the Provider and the Recipient
are compelled legally to use the SA MTA only if the
intended transfer contains ‘biological material’ in its or-
dinary meaning. In other words, if only data is trans-
ferred, the parties are not required to enter into a MTA
using the SA MTA as a framework. Until POPIA fully
enters into force, the sharing of only genomic data is
therefore unregulated. We suggest that this issue should
be rectified by the Minister in an amended notice that
refers to ‘human biological material and associated data’
instead of ‘biological material’.
The SA MTA states that it sets out a ‘framework’ ([13]
paragraph 1). We agree with Labuschaigne et al. that this
means that the terms in the SA MTA need not be
duplicated verbatim [30]. We suggest that the essence of
the terms contained in the SA MTA nevertheless must
be retained as a basic structure but is one on which the
parties are permitted to elaborate. The practical prob-
lem, however, is that the exact extent to which parties
may depart from the SA MTA is uncertain. This uncer-
tainty presents a major problem for HRECs which, al-
though they count having lawyers among their
membership, are given the task of judging whether any
particular MTA departs too far from the SA MTA. We
suggest that legal certainty would be better served – and
the South African research community assisted and pro-
tected – had the SA MTA indicated exactly which of its
terms (or underlying principles) are compulsory and
which are voluntary.
HRECs as parties to the MTA
The SA MTA requires that a HREC registered as such
with the South African National Health Research Ethics
Council must be a party to the MTA. There are a num-
ber of uncertainties which relate to this requirement: If
both the Provider and the Recipient are in South Africa,
which one’s HREC should be a party to the MTA, and, if
both the Provider and the Recipient are in South Africa,
is it possible for both their HRECs to be parties to the
MTA?
As well as these practical issues there is the more fun-
damental question regarding the issue of juristic person-
hood; being a party to an agreement requires contractual
capacity and in turn requires juristic personhood. How-
ever, this requirement is problematic as the vast majority
of HRECs in South Africa do not have juristic person-
hood. As discussed in the background, all HRECs except
one are committees of larger organisations. In South Af-
rican law a juristic person can be established in only
three ways: (a) through specific legislation, where a stat-
ute creates a body and explicitly bestows juristic person-
hood on it; (b) through executive government action in
terms of general legislation, for instance where the Com-
panies and Intellectual Property Commission registers a
new company; or (c) through the common law, where
an organisation is established with the aim of existing as
an independent legal entity that, inter alia, has the cap-
acity to acquire its own rights and incur obligations [31].
We suggest that HRECs that are committees of research
institutions do not qualify as belonging to any of these
three categories: First, nothing in the NHA [14] (the
statute that requires that an institution that conducts
health research either has its own HREC or has access
to a HREC) suggests that HRECs possess juristic person-
hood. Secondly, the fact that an institution that conducts
health research establishes an internal committee in pur-
suance of legislation does not constitute action by the
executive branch of government. In the case of an
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institution such as a university establishing a research
ethics committee in pursuance of the NHA, it is no dif-
ferent from when a university establishes structures in
pursuance of other legislation, for instance technology
transfer offices (TTOs) that are established in pursuance
of the requirements of the Intellectual Property Rights
from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act
[18]. Thirdly, HRECs that are committees of institutions
are unlikely to be common law juristic persons. These
HRECs function as organs of an institution rather than
as independent legal entities with their own legal rights
distinct from those of the institution; in other words, if a
university were to stop existing, the university’s HREC
also ceases. The conclusion of this analysis is that of 46
HRECs in South Africa only the one that is registered as
a private company legally would be capable of being a
party to a MTA. For the other 45 HRECs being a party
to a MTA is a legal impossibility.
There is a potential counter-argument that should be
considered, namely that the Minister of Health in requir-
ing HRECs to be parties to the SA MTA implicitly chan-
ged the law to bestow juristic personhood upon HRECs.
We suggest that this counter-argument is flawed – if it
was indeed the Minister’s intention to bestow juristic
personhood upon HRECs, the action is ultra vires and
invalid. Our reasons are as follows: Although the NHA
gives the Minister broad powers to regulate matters re-
lated to health in South Africa, the capacity to bestow
juristic personhood on HRECs is not one of these pow-
ers. The SA MTA is delegated legislation and, as such,
cannot regulate matters outside of the framework estab-
lished by the enabling legislation (the NHA). Accord-
ingly, the Minister will be acting ultra vires if he
attempts to change the law implicitly to bestow juristic
personhood on HRECs through the SA MTA. A more
likely possibility, we suggest, is that the requirement in
the SA MTA that HRECs must be parties to MTAs is
ill-considered and is an oversight on the part of the Min-
ister’s legal advisors.
Labuschaigne et al. argue in support of HRECs being
parties to MTAs for two main reasons: first, because
HRECs are in a position to fulfil an oversight function
with regard to MTAs and, secondly, because, in their
view, a HREC can act as a neutral third party to a MTA
to ensure negotiation in good faith and unbiased imple-
mentation [30]. We suggest that these reasons are un-
convincing. As discussed above, HRECs have a mandate
to ensure that health research complies with ethical
standards; this mandate, first and foremost, includes
protecting the interests of research participants. Accord-
ingly, HRECs have an important oversight function in
respect of MTAs to ensure that there is consistency be-
tween the terms of a MTA and what was promised to
the research participant during the informed consent
procedure. However, this oversight function, we suggest,
is a reason for HRECs to not be parties to MTAs and to
remain super partes. Being a party to MTAs would lead
to a situation in which HRECs must exercise oversight
over themselves as parties, which clearly is an untenable
situation. Furthermore, the notion that HRECs play the
role of a neutral third party between its own research in-
stitution and another research institution in order to en-
sure negotiation in good faith and unbiased
implementation is entirely outside the mandate of
HRECs. In any event, if some kind of neutral mediator is
needed to ensure good faith negotiation and unbiased
implementation, the mediator need not be made a party
to the MTA. We suggest that HRECs should be kept at
a proper distance from the negotiation of the terms of
MTAs and should not compromise their objectivity by
being involved in negotiations.
Being a party to MTAs therefore not only is a legal
impossibility in most instances, but also is incompatible
with HRECs’ statutory oversight role. To resolve this
issue we suggest that the Minister amends the SA MTA
to remove reference to HRECs as parties to MTAs. This
amendment will not undermine HRECs’ oversight func-
tion – on the contrary it will facilitate it.
Lastly, on the topic of HRECs’ oversight role we raise
a practical concern. Although the Department of Health
Ethics Guidelines require an HREC to have at least one
member that is ‘legally qualified’ ([20] p41), this require-
ment does not necessarily enable the HREC to fulfil its
oversight function over MTAs without the need to ob-
tain external legal advice. The exercise of ensuring
consistency between the terms of the MTA and the
terms of the consent by the research participants, de-
pending on the intricacy of these terms, can require spe-
cialist expertise in contract law. Furthermore, the
contractual terms in a MTA often relate to various spe-
cialised areas within the law such as intellectual property
law and medical law, which typically require input from
more than one specialist lawyer. As such, when consid-
ering a MTA, HRECs should not hesitate to request a
legal opinion from their institutions’ internal legal de-
partments, or, where appropriate, from a law firm.
Research participant consent
The definition of ‘Project’ in the SA MTA declares it to
mean ‘the health research project for which the Mate-
rials will be used’ ([13] paragraph 2.15). No indication is
given as to how broad or how specifically defined the re-
search project must be. In its definition of ‘Informed
Consent’ the SA MTA provides that the research partici-
pant must (a) give informed consent for the donation of
their Materials to the ‘project’ (presumably ‘Project’ with
a capital ‘P’ was intended), but also (b) give informed
consent on an ongoing basis to whether and how their
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Materials will be utilised in the (same) ‘Project’, as ap-
proved by the HREC from time to time ([13] para-
graph 2.12). It therefore appears that a single ‘Project’
can entail multiple different uses of the Materials that
may arise from time to time. As such, a ‘Project’ in this
context appears to be more akin to a research
programme which can comprise any number of distinct
research projects – with new projects added on an on-
going basis. Conversely, under the heading ‘Informed
Consent’ the SA MTA refers to a ‘project protocol’
(again, presumably ‘Project’ with a capital ‘P’ was
intended), which suggests that a Project is something
that is associated with a single protocol – id est a dis-
tinct research project ([13] paragraph 10.2). Given this
paradoxical use of the term ‘Project’, it is difficult to pin
down exactly how broad or specific research participant
consent must be in terms of the SA MTA. In the interest
of clarity, we suggest that the SA MTA be amended to
differentiate between a research programme and a dis-
tinct research project within such a programme.
However, what is clear is the introduction of dynamic
consent – the idea that consent must be obtained on an
on-going basis for new uses of the Materials. This is a
departure from the position in the Department of Health
Ethics Guidelines, which recommend that consent
should be ‘broad enough to allow for future and second-
ary uses of data’ ([20] p31). Because the SA MTA is the
more recent piece of secondary legislation, its dynamic
consent provisions will take precedence over the provi-
sions of the Department of Health Ethics Guidelines.
However, this will only happen when the SA MTA is
triggered into application by the transfer of human bio-
logical material. In other words, when health research
does not entail the transfer of human biological material
between research institutions, the consent provisions of
the Department of Health Ethics Guidelines remain
applicable.
It should be noted that POPIA’s consent provisions
will in turn take precedence over the SA MTA. How-
ever, as stated in the background section above, it might
be premature at this stage to analyse the SA MTA in the
light of POPIA.
Lastly, the issue of consent by children requires atten-
tion. According to the SA MTA, only research partici-
pants with legal capacity to enter into an agreement
([13] paragraph 2.12). In other words, persons of 18
years and above or emancipated children, can consent to
their Materials being transferred by a Provider to a Re-
cipient. There is no provision in the SA MTA that (un-
emancipated) children who have legally provided their
Materials in terms of section 71 of the NHA can consent
to their Material being transferred by a Provider to a Re-
cipient. This imposition militates against a need for chil-
dren to be part of health research and clinical trials in
order to develop cures for children. We suggest that this
represents a clear error in the SA MTA that can have
dire consequences for children’s health. The SA MTA
should be amended to bring it into alignment with sec-
tion 71 of the NHA.
Ownership of material
The SA MTA provides that the research participant ‘re-
mains the owner’ of his or her human biological material
and the data that is derived ([13] paragraph 3.3). How-
ever, as noted in the background above, extant South Af-
rican law provides that when research participants
donate their human biological material, among other
reasons, for research, the institution to which the human
biological material is donated acquires exclusive rights
in the human biological material ([17] regulation 26). By
logical extension, the research institution in the absence
of a specific contractual arrangement would enjoy exclu-
sive rights in all derivatives from such human biological
material, including data generated from it.
The only way to reconcile the SA MTA with extant
law is to interpret the ownership provided for in the SA
MTA as nominal ownership without any rights in the
human biological material or the associated data, that is,
ownership in name only. This issue might appear to be a
legal technicality, but it is worth remembering that the
lack of rights in the human biological material or the as-
sociated data does not mean that the research partici-
pant is without rights related to these material and data.
For instance, the research participant can have rights
vis-à-vis the research institution to which the human
biological material was donated and to its successor in
title. These rights can include the right to be kept
abreast of the research that is conducted on the human
biological material, the right to refuse that the human
biological material be used for further research beyond
the initial research project, the right to request that the
human biological material be destroyed, and so forth.
The point is that a research participant’s rights related
to the research that is conducted on the human bio-
logical material he or she donated do not depend on be-
ing the owner of the donated human biological material,
but can be agreed on separately and in detail.
The SA MTA’s ownership provision might have been
intended as a symbolic means to acknowledge the sig-
nificance that is accorded to human biological material
in some South African cultures. Also, this provision
might have been intended to strengthen the bargaining
position of research participants in the allocation of ben-
efits derived from research. However, these possible aims
raise the question whether the legal concept of owner-
ship is an appropriate means to accomplish these aims.
Ownership may have symbolic value, but in the broader
context of the South African legal landscape, as analysed
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above, ownership’s value is only symbolic (qua nominal
ownership) and therefore can mislead research partici-
pants into thinking that they have greater legal rights
than they actually do. For instance, if the research re-
ceives any public funding, extant South African law ex-
plicitly provides that the research institution that is the
recipient of such public funding is entitled to own the
intellectual property emanating from such research and
that research participants do not by virtue of being re-
search participants qualify for any ownership rights in
intellectual property [18].
Apart from potentially being misleading, ownership
provisions alone cannot solve the various legal and eth-
ical challenges of a fair distribution of benefits between
all the stakeholders in complex transnational research
collaboration. More detailed contractual arrangements
that carefully are in line with extant law and that clearly
specify the rights and duties of parties are required to
achieve the aim of a fair distribution of benefits. Accord-
ingly, we suggest that the ownership provision in the SA
MTA can do more harm than good and should rather
be removed from the SA MTA. As proposed in our dis-
cussion of benefit sharing below, best practice guidelines
for benefit sharing in South Africa should be developed
in consultation with all stakeholders. Such guidelines
can provide for other means of symbolic recognition of
the significance accorded human biological material in
some South African cultures and can provide detailed
options to accomplish a fair distribution of benefits that
align with extant law.
Legal fiction of transfer of material
In its current form the SA MTA provides that the HREC
must sign the MTA last ([13] paragraph 6.2); and that
the MTA becomes effective (only) upon signature by the
HREC ([13] paragraph 8). The SA MTA further provides
that once the MTA becomes effective, the Material that
is the subject of the MTA automatically is deemed to be
transferred by the Provider and accepted by the Recipi-
ent ([13] paragraph 3.1). These provisions create a legal
conundrum: if the Provider in fact fails to transfer the
Material to the Recipient, in what way would the Recipi-
ent enforce its rights in terms of the MTA. Note the Re-
cipient signs that it ‘accepted’ the transfer of the
Material. Clearly this situation is an untenable position
in which the parties find themselves. We suggest that
the SA MTA be amended to remove the deemed-
transfer-and-acceptance provision and replace it with a
standard provision that enables the parties to determine
their own dates of transfer. Also, it would be useful for
the parties to stipulate in their MTA exactly how the hu-
man biological material and associated data should be
de-identified pre-transfer, how the human biological
material should be shipped and how the associated data
should be made accessible.
Benefit sharing
The SA MTA requires that benefit sharing between the
Provider and Recipient must be ‘discussed and negoti-
ated’ before any Material may be transferred ([13] para-
graph 7.1). This requirement is vague: the words
‘discussed and negotiated’ do not mean the same as ‘hav-
ing reached agreement’. In fact, the words ‘discussed and
negotiated’ do not actually require a benefit sharing
agreement. We suggest that parties to a MTA should
ensure that indeed they have reached agreement regard-
ing benefit sharing before signing the MTA and attach
and incorporate their benefit-sharing agreement to the
MTA. In the interest of legal certainty we suggest that
the SA MTA be amended to replace ‘discussed and ne-
gotiated’ with the term ‘agreed’.
As discussed in the background section above, the
NHA provides that compensation for giving human bio-
logical material for research must be limited to reason-
able costs and that to receive any form of financial or
other reward is a criminal offence ([14] section 60(4),
(5)). Accordingly, some possible kinds of benefit sharing
clearly are not lawful options. Against this background,
the SA MTA could have provided useful guidance re-
garding the legally-acceptable and ethically-preferable
content of substantive terms of a benefit-sharing agree-
ment at the levels of individual research participants,
their communities (where relevant), the health system,
and local researchers. We suggest that best practice
guidelines should be developed in consultation with
stakeholders.
Dispute resolution
The SA MTA provides that in the event that a dispute
cannot be resolved amicably any party can institute ac-
tion in accordance with South African law in a South Af-
rican court, unless the parties agree to resolve such
dispute by arbitration in terms of a separate arbitration
agreement ([13] paragraph 11.3). This provision is prob-
lematic in at least two respects: First, in law instituting
an action has a technical meaning which refers to a spe-
cific type of civil procedure. The alternative to an action
is an application procedure, which should be utilised
when no material factual dispute is foreseen and which
is considerably quicker and cheaper than an action pro-
cedure. However, the SA MTA does not make provision
for a quicker and cheaper court procedure, which over-
sight should be remedied by amending the SA MTA to
provide that in the event that a dispute cannot be re-
solved amicably any party can institute an action or
application.
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The second issue taken with paragraph 11.3 of the SA
MTA is that it is unclear whether an arbitration agree-
ment can change the legal system and place of adjudica-
tion to a jurisdiction other than South Africa. If the
answer is that parties indeed legally can elect to use an
arbitration agreement to opt out of South African law
and out of adjudication in South Africa, a party that has
more negotiating power can use its power to insist on
an arbitration agreement that stipulates a legal system,
arbitration rules and place of adjudication that benefit it.
It is unlikely many South African research institutions
have the resources to finance protracted and expensive
arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction. From a South Afri-
can perspective this situation clearly is an undesirable
outcome.
Labuschaigne et al. seem to accept that an arbitration
agreement indeed can change the legal system and place
of adjudication to a jurisdiction other than South Africa
[30]. Although Labuschaigne et al. recognise that arbitra-
tion abroad may be unaffordable to South African par-
ties, nevertheless they take the position that the
arbitration option is necessary because in their view it is
‘in keeping with standards prescribed by Western coun-
terparts’ [30]. This argument raises important policy
questions, such as: Should South African policy making
be prescribed to by entities in other countries? Is it not
the purpose of the SA MTA to protect the interests, in-
ter alia, of the South African research community? On
the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect foreign re-
search collaborators, whether they are Providers or Re-
cipients, always to agree to South African jurisdiction
over disputes.
We suggest that a fair solution would be that the juris-
diction of the Provider as a general rule should be the
applicable legal system and place of adjudication for any
disputes related to the MTA – whether through litiga-
tion in the courts or through arbitration. The main rea-
son behind the proposal is that it would ensure greater
access to justice for research participants in that re-
search participants are likely to be in the same country
as the Provider. In the event that research participants
have a direct and material interest in a dispute between
a Provider and a Recipient they would be able to join
the dispute in their own country rather than in a foreign
country and with a foreign legal system. However, our
suggested solution should not be interpreted as a rigid
rule; parties should be allowed to approach the Minister
(or his delegate) to grant an exemption to the general
rule in cases of merit.
Intellectual property
The navigation of intellectual property law is complex
and rife with opposing interests. However, the SA MTA
provides simply that intellectual property will be dealt
with through ‘relevant laws’ and ‘third-party agreements,
as far as there are any’ ([13] paragraph 12). It is import-
ant to note that the SA MTA stipulates that the MTA
will embody and constitute the ‘entire agreement’ be-
tween the parties, which would exclude third-party
agreements ([13] paragraph 17.1). Accordingly, all the
relevant third-party agreements should be attached as
annexures to the MTA and their content explicitly in-
corporated into the MTA. Absent this measure, a third-
party agreement is likely to be held as not binding on
the other party to a MTA.
In copyright law, a database is a type of ‘literary work’
and automatically qualifies for copyright protection [32].
Given that data associated with human biological mater-
ial typically are in the form of a database, such data (as
compiled in the database) are the intellectual property of
the research institution where the database was created
and is independent of any rights regarding the individual
bits of data that comprise the database. In addition, data
(as compiled in the database) also, depending on the
business model of the research institute where the data-
base was created, may qualify as a trade secret of the re-
search institute. Accordingly, in the event that data
associated with human biological material is to be trans-
ferred, the parties should be acutely aware that they are
dealing with already-existing intellectual property. Core
considerations, among others, are: Does the Provider as-
sign ownership of the data (as compiled in the database)
to the Recipient, give a (non-exclusive or exclusive) right
to use (a use-licence) or simply disclose the data on a
confidential basis? What are the rights of the Provider in
any intellectual property that may be created by the Re-
cipient? How will the research results be commercia-
lised? How will publications be coordinated, and how
will authorship be determined?
It is unfortunate that the SA MTA does not give any
guidance to the South African research community re-
garding recommended (or best practice) intellectual
property provisions. After all, intellectual property is the
currency of the knowledge economy and is something
that South Africa should prudently manage. Further-
more, intellectual property and its use also are linked to
benefit sharing. If the benefits of health research must
be fairly shared, it would be helpful if the SA MTA pro-
vided guidance regarding the ways intellectual property
and its use should be directed to achieve a fair outcome.
We suggest that best practice guidelines for intellectual
property provisions be developed in consultation with
stakeholders.
Data privacy
The SA MTA appears to offer broad confidentiality pro-
tection ([13] paragraphs 5.2, 13). However, we suggest
that the protection is insufficiently specific and
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overbroad. For instance, the SA MTA provides that the
Provider and the Recipient shall treat ‘all information’
relating to the ‘nature and processes of the research’ as
confidential ([13] paragraph 13.3). This proposition
means that the parties may not reveal even the nature of
the research project, such as ‘research on HIV’, to a po-
tential grant funder. We suggest that clearly this
provision is overbroad and should be remedied through
Table 1 Summary improve the SA MTA
Provision Proposed amendment
1 Application
Notice by the Minister Replace the words ‘biological material’ with ‘human biological material and associated data’.
2 Health Research Ethics Committees
Recital of parties, paragraph 2.14 and
throughout the SA MTA
Remove HRECs as parties.
3 Consent
Paragraph 2.15 and throughout the SA
MTA
Paragraph 2.12
Differentiate between a research programme and research projects in a programme.
Replace the phrase ‘(with legal capacity to do so)’ with ‘and/or the research participant’s parents or
guardians in terms of the National Health Act’.
4 Ownership in Material
Paragraph 3.3 Strike out the phrase: ‘and the donor remains the owner of the material until such materials are
destroyed.’
5 Transfer of Material
Paragraph 6.2 Replace the current paragraph with the following: ‘The Provider will deliver the Materials to the
Recipient according to the following schedule, and in the following media or formats: …’
6 Benefit sharing
Paragraph 7.1 The words ‘discussed and negotiated’ must be replaced with ‘agreed’.
(In the longer term) Best practice guidelines to be developed in consultation with stakeholders.
7 Dispute resolution
Paragraph 11.3 Insert a new paragraph 11.2A that reads: ‘In the event that the Provider is located in South Africa, this
agreement will be interpreted according to the law of South Africa.’
Insert a new paragraph 11.2B that reads: ‘In the event that the Provider is located in South Africa the
division of the high court of South Africa where the Provider is located will have jurisdiction over any
dispute related to this agreement except if the parties agree to arbitration, in which case the
arbitration hearing must take place within the jurisdiction of the division of the high court of South
Africa mentioned above.’
Insert a new paragraph 11.2C that reads: ‘The Parties may only depart from the provisions of
paragraph 11.2A and 11.2B above if written permission by the Minister is obtained, in which event the
letter of permission must be attached hereto.’
Insert a new paragraph 11.2D that reads:
‘Cognisant of the principles contained in paragraphs 11.2A to 11.2C above, the Parties record their
agreement that this Agreement will be interpreted according to the law of … [insert name of
jurisdiction], and that any dispute related to this agreement will be adjudicated in … [insert name of
level of court and jurisdiction].’
Replace the phrase in paragraph 11.3 ‘either Party may institute action in accordance with South
African laws, in a South African court, unless the Parties agree to resolve such dispute by arbitration in
terms of a separate arbitration agreement’ with ‘either Party may institute legal proceedings in a court
that has jurisdiction, unless the Parties agree to resolve such dispute by arbitration in terms of a
separate arbitration agreement, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 11.2A to 11.2D above.’
8 Intellectual property
Paragraph 12 Insert a new paragraph 12A that all relevant third-party agreements must be listed in the MTA,
attached to the MTA, and that their content is deemed to be incorporated into the MTA.
(In the longer term) Best practice guidelines to be developed in consultation with stakeholders.
9 Data Privacy
Paragraph 13.3 Replace the current paragraph with the following: ‘The Provider and the Recipient shall treat all
information relating to the nature and processes of the research in whatever form as confidential,
subject to necessary disclosure of any information in the ordinary course of business, including for
purposes of funding applications, complying with funding requirements, and as specified in the
Recipient’s research protocol.’
(In the longer term) The relevant POPIA provisions should be condensed to contractual terms by
privacy law experts, officially approved by the Information Regulator and included as standard terms
in a revised SA MTA.
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amendment by the Minister to include the following
qualification at the end of the confidentiality provision: ‘
… subject to necessary disclosure of any information in
the ordinary course of business, including for purposes
of funding applications, complying with funding require-
ments, and as specified in the Recipient’s research
protocol’.
As discussed in the background above, the protection
of personal information will be governed by a statute
that has been developed specifically for this purpose,
POPIA [21]. The SA MTA can complement POPIA and
facilitate its implementation. In cases where a Provider
in South Africa intends to transfer human biological ma-
terial or associated data to a Recipient in a foreign coun-
try and that foreign country does not provide an
‘adequate level of protection for the processing of per-
sonal information’, the Provider will have to obtain prior
authorisation for the intended transfer from the Infor-
mation Regulator ([21] section 57(1)(d)). In such cases a
solution would be to contractually bind the foreign Re-
cipient to specific terms that are aligned with POPIA –
in effect identify and include all the provisions of POPIA
that are relevant to the transfer of human biological ma-
terial or associated data as contractual terms in a MTA.
In this context a revised SA MTA might play an import-
ant role; it would greatly assist the South African re-
search community if the relevant POPIA provisions can
be condensed to establish contractual terms by privacy
law experts, be officially approved by the Information
Regulator, and included as standard terms in a revised
SA MTA. We suggest that the Minister of Health should
consider initiating such a project.
Conclusions
It seems reasonable to entertain the notion of a national
standard MTA that addresses the legal concerns specific
to South Africa, that is respectful of local culture and
that assists generally South African research institutions
and their international collaborators in complying with
the law and share the benefits of research in a fair way.
However, the manner in which it has been put into prac-
tice by the SA MTA is deeply problematic in terms of its
substantive fit with the broader legal environment in
South Africa, its clarity and its legal practicality. Al-
though some of the issues are complex and require con-
sultative processes with stakeholders and others, to
develop comprehensive solutions, most of the issues that
we have identified in the SA MTA as problematic can be
resolved immediately through relatively simple amend-
ments by the Minister. Table 1 presents a summary of
our proposed amendments to improve the SA MTA.
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